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Summary. - The purpose of this paper is to develop an understanding of the economic functions and 
associated welfare implications of the cooperative associations that dominate the wholesale trade in two 
staple foods. Questionnaire responses lead to several conclusions. Individual traders face incomplete 
markets, imperfect information, and little government-provided institutional and physical infrastructure. 
The associations are sophisticated "Coase-like" responses to this market environment: they focus on 
reducing their members' transaction costs, and hence the marginal private costs of trading. Thus it is 
likely that these associations enhance efficiency. We conclude with a critique of current government 
policy with respect to this trade. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Most of the marketing of staple foodstuffs in 
urban West Africa takes place within the "informal 
sector" of the economy. This is particularly true in 
Ibadan, the principal Y aruba city in western Nigeria 
and the second largest urban area in the country. 
Ibadan's informal-sector foodstuff traders operate in 
a world of incomplete markets for credit and trans-
port, imperfect information, and little government-
provided institutional or physical infrastructure. 
Individual wholesale traders have for decades 
responded to these features of their market environ-
ment by conducting their operations within the con-
text of cooperative associations that function in 
many ways as cartels. Informal-sector foodstuff trad-
ing in Ibadan thus takes place in a setting that differs 
in significant ways from that of perfect competition: 
collective behavior in the marketplace has intro-
duced a significant element of cooperation into the 
foodstuff marketing process. 
Although some economists tend to employ the 
working hypothesis that cooperative activities are 
"market imperfections" that impose deadweight loss-
es of economic welfare upon society, others have 
shown that the welfare implications of collective 
behavior in the marketplace must be analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis. For example, "Second Best" wel-
fare theory- as pioneered by Meade (1955) and 
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57) and refined and uti-
lized by many others, including Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1986, 1988) and Stiglitz (1991)- points 
out that, depending on the specific market context, 
noncompetitive behavior may or may not be welfare-
reducing. Heimberger (1964), in his classic study of 
farmer marketing cooperatives, reaches the same 
conclusion. He thus argues that theory alone cannot 
support a general policy stance toward cooperative 
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activities: the welfare consequences of a specific 
instance of collective behavior can only be deter-
mined in light of the central "structural and environ-
mental characteristics" of the relevant marketplace 
(p. 617). 
Following Helm berger's advice, we undertake 
here a context-specific study of the economic func-
tions, and the associated welfare implications, of the 
traders' associations- known in Yoruba as egbes 
- that dominate much of the wholesale foodstuff 
trade in Ibadan. More specifically, we focus on the 
activities of the elubo (dried yam) and lafun 
(processed cassava) wholesalers' egbes, in the 
attempt to discern their implications for social wel-
fare. We conclude that the associations, which we 
analyze as responses to those features of the market 
environment that impinge upon the traders, may 
indeed create both private benefits for their members 
and net benefits for society as a whole. But present 
Nigerian policy with respect to the urban informal-
sector foodstuff trade can be characterized as one of, 
on average, open hostility and harassment. In light of 
our analysis, such a policy stance may well be mis-
guided and indeed welfare-reducing. 
Since the late 1960s a tremendous amount of 
research has been done, both inside and outside of 
sub-Saharan Africa, that has had either a direct or 
indirect influence on the present study. Below we 
summarize these branches of inquiry by citing the 
seminal works in each area and reporting the key 
results that provide the context within which our 
work can be understood. 
The modern research agenda with respect to the 
urban informal sector was essentially defined by 
Hart (1973) - in which the term "informal sector" 
first appeared in the literature - and the report of 
the International Labour Office (ILO) 1972 
Employment Mission to Kenya. This latter study, 
indeed, galvanized the multilateral aid and develop-
ment community into sponsoring a series of studies 
on this sector. During the next 20 years most of the 
research on the informal sector in urban Africa south 
of the Sahara was carried out under the auspices of 
the ILO, with the findings summarized and evaluated 
in several papers, monographs, and books (e.g., 
Sethuraman, 1981; ILO-JASPA, 1985; Trager, 1987; 
Turnham, Salome, and Schwarz, 1990; Lubell, 
1991). 
The urban informal sector in Nigeria has been 
investigated extensively. The ILO, during its World 
Employment Programme effort of the 1970s, studied 
the informal sector in both Lagos and Kana (see 
Sethuraman, 1981). Informal economic activity in 
the city of Benin was examined in the mid-1970s by 
a geographer (Onokerhoraye, 1977), and Ekpenyong 
(1985) did extensive survey research on the informal 
sector in the cities of Port Harcourt and Calabar. 
Finally, Callaway ( 1967) analyzed activity within 
the informal sector of Ibadan itself. Despite the fact 
that Callaway's work predated both Hart's and the 
ILO Kenya Mission, it had the same focus and pur-
pose as these later studies. 
All of the above studies focused upon what Nihan 
(1980) first termed the "non-structured modern" sub-
sector of the urban informal sector, which consists 
primarily of manufacturing (e.g., metalworking and 
woodworking), repair services (in particular mechan-
ical and electrical repair), and construction. The 
common purpose of these studies was to identify the 
characteristics of and the constraints facing so-called 
microenterprises in this subsector. It was hoped that 
this information would then facilitate the design of 
financial and technical assistance programs that 
would enable the more "viable" of these production 
units to contribute to employment, incomes, growth, 
and development (Lubell, 1991). 
These studies combined to reveal a dynamic and 
productive urban informal sector in sub-Saharan 
Africa that comprises 40-60% of the urban labor 
force. Despite the fact that the 1972 ILO Kenya 
Mission report - and in consequence many subse-
quent research programs - defined urban informal-
sector markets a priori as characterized by ease of 
entry and perfectly competitive conditions, it was 
discovered that "in many instances entry is not espe-
cially easy" (Lubell, 1991, p. 17). The studies cited 
above - along with that of House ( 1984 ), which 
focused on the informal sector in Nairobi, Kenya-
described significant barriers to entry in many infor-
mal-sector markets, traceable to lack of access to (a) 
suitable physical and institutional infrastructure (e.g., 
work premises, electricity, water, a properly func-
tioning legal system that defines property rights and 
enforces contracts), and (b) formal-sector credit 
facilities. 
In terms of employment, trading generally domi-
nates the informal sector. Despite this fact, all of the 
above analysts, except House and to a lesser extent 
Onokerhoraye, explicitly excluded trading activities 
(whether wholesale or retail) from their samples. 
Most research efforts, indeed, were predicated upon 
the belief that such activities were "unproductive" 
and thus should not be targeted for microenterprise 
support programs. 
Interestingly, Onokerhoraye, Ekpenyong, and 
Callaway all suggest that cooperative activities were 
prevalent at various times and in various subsectors 
of the informal sectors in Nigeria that they studied. 
Onokerhoraye (pp. 58-59) reports that many entre-
preneurs, including "different types of traders," were 
organized into "guilds" in precolonial times that 
"controlled entry" and "in some cases [controlled] 
prices." Ekpenyong notes that some artisans market-
ed their products in Port Harcourt and Calabar 
through "cooperative societies." In Ibadan, coopera-
tive activities in the informal sector were, in 
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Callaway's judgement, common in the 1960s: crafts-
men in many trades operated in "loose cooperative 
groups" or "unions" that bought inputs jointly and 
shared work; associations of businessmen "pressed 
for the common good"; "unions" of traders engaged 
in "price fixing" and in cooperative efforts with 
respect to materials purchases and marketing ( 1967, 
p. 159). 
Another branch of research relevant to the pre-
sent study comprises the work of the economist 
Boserup (1971) and anthropologists such as 
Sudarkasa (1973), Hay and Stichter (1984), and 
Trager (1976, 1981, 1985, 1988). These analysts 
studied the economic activities of the Y oruba "mar-
ket women" of western Nigeria. Each notes that 
urban Yoruba female foodstuff traders belong to 
market associations -Callaway's "unions," or 
egbes. Trager (1981) reports more specifically that 
all sellers of each commodity must belong to such an 
association. In addition to stating that the egbes rep-
resent the traders' interests outside the marketplace, 
Trager indicates (without further comment) that the 
associations act to "settle disputes" among their 
members. 
The seminal studies of foodstuff marketing in 
southern Nigeria and lbadan were carried out by 
Hodder (1967), Gusten (1968), and Jones (1972). 
Each study (and Hodder's in particular) focused on 
the anatomy of the location- and time-specific "mar-
kets" - known in Y oruba as oja - in lbadan and its 
hinterlands. Gusten concerned himself with the food-
stuff marketing chain, and traces carefully the flows 
of foodstuffs into Ibadan from rural areas. Gusten 
and Hodder together identify the specialized whole-
sale foodstuff markets in lbadan, and describe rather 
than analyze the activities that take place within 
them. 
Jones (1972) moves beyond Gusten and Hodder 
to develop, in his words, an "economic appraisal" of 
the efficiency of the foodstuff marketing system in 
southern Nigeria, in order to provide a context with-
in which governmental interventions can be evalua-
ted. He employs the model of perfect competition as 
a benchmark against which he evaluates the efficien-
cy implications of the actual conditions under which 
trading occurs, and examines the behavior of the 
existing price series. He concludes that in general the 
foodstuff marketing process in southern Nigeria is 
perfectly competitive, although he cautions that 
"generalizations about African marketing may be 
misleading when applied to a paiticular commodity" 
(1972, p. 6). 
Nevertheless, Jones notes the presence of what he 
calls "guild-type organizations" or "trade associa-
tions" to which many traders belong. Indeed, he calls 
them a "feature" of the marketing landscape in 
southern Nigeria (p. 1 08). Their "leaders are fre-
quently honored and respected," and they "may 
restrict entry into a commodity trade to some extent 
and also regulate trading practices." But, given the 
"large size" of the markets in question and the num-
bers of traders involved, Jones concludes that these 
associations probably do not significantly alter the 
competitive nature of the foodstuff marketing 
process (p. 105). 
In sum, many of the seminal studies on Nigeria 
and Ibadan identify -as we do -the existence of 
cooperative associations of traders, whether they are 
termed "unions," "guilds," or egbes. Collective 
behavior among traders in the urban informal sectors 
of Nigeria has thus been present for decades. But 
none of the studies cited above examines these asso-
ciations in any direct way as economic entities pur-
suing their activities within particular economic and 
institutional contexts. Our work, therefore, con-
tributes to each of the above research traditions in a 
substantive way. 
In a broader context, this study can be viewed as 
contributing to the literature on what we can call 
"the private and social advantages of collective 
behavior in the marketplace." This literature consists 
of many diverse strands. 1 For example, it includes 
work on the coordination of economic activity with-
in the firm and more broadly on the determinants of 
organizational structure (e.g., Coase, 1937, 1960; 
Arrow, 1964, 1969, 1974; Williamson, 1985, 1986; 
Ben-Ner, Brada, and Neuberger, 1993; Ben-Ner, 
Montias, and Neuberger, 1993). Another line of 
inquiry focuses on interfirm or interagent coopera-
tion in developed countries (e.g., Arrow, 1974; the 
work by Brusco (1982) and Capecchi (1989) on the 
informal sector in the Emilia-Romagna region of 
Italy during the post-WWII period; Purvis's 1990 
study of cooperative societies in 19th-century 
England and Wales). Finally, this literature encom-
passes studies of the social structures prevalent in 
Third World urban informal sectors that enable their 
members to minimize the risks of doing business in a 
low-income and uncertain world (e.g., Papanek, 
197 5; Doeringer, 1986; J agannathan, 1987). 
In the light of this broadly defined research tradi-
tion, the elubo and lafun wholesalers' associations in 
Ibadan can be viewed as the social structures within 
which cooperative arrangements between individual 
traders are developed and maintained. Within their 
egbes, individual traders acquire "social assets" (in 
the language of Arrow, 1974; Doeringer, 1986; and 
Jagannathan, 1987) such as loyalty, friendship, and 
trust. These assets, in turn, enable the members to 
segment the marketplace in significant ways, and 
hence to garner economic benefits that would other-
wise be unobtainable. Specifically, association mem-
bers dominate the wholesale distribution of elubo 
and lafun in lbadan, because first, they control the 
traders' access to the urban oja in which these prod-
ucts are sold, and second, the egbes prevent non-
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member traders from acquiring inventory, namely 
elubo and lafun, in the rural oja surrounding the city. 
Yet the associations do not regulate urban selling 
prices. Nor do they enforce sales quotas. Instead, the 
egbes concentrate on decreasing their members' 
transaction costs. In particular, the associations 
reduce the marginal private costs of trading by 
expanding their members' access to transport and 
credit facilities, collecting and disseminating to 
members information that individual traders find too 
expensive to acquire on their own, and providing, 
where the government does not, the necessary insti-
tutional and physical market infrastructure. 
Thus it is possible that these egbes generate prof-
its for their members, provide public goods for soci-
ety as a whole, and enable more trading - at lower 
prices - to take place in the urban markets. In this 
situation, as in others cited by Jagannathan (1987), 
Brusco (1982), Capecchi (1989), and Doeringer 
( 1986), there may well be no conflict between the 
pursuit of private gain and social welfare. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2 
we describe the informal-sector distribution system 
for elubo and lafun in Ibadan, and the market setting 
within which the urban wholesalers operate. We also 
describe the methodology used in our study, and dis-
cuss some of the central characteristics of our sam-
ple. Section 3 contains an analysis of egbe opera-
tions in both the urban and rural marketplaces. A 
more formal, graphical treatment of egbe behavior 
and its welfare implications is presented in section 4. 
We conclude by summarizing our results and dis-
cussing their implications for development policy. 
2. THE MARKETING CHAIN, THE RESEARCH 
SAMPLE, AND THE MARKET ENVIRONMENT 
(a) The marketing chain 
The process by which elubo and lafun are mar-
keted in Ibadan today remains virtually unchanged 
from that observed by Hodder, Gus ten, and Jones. 
Fresh yams and/or cassava are grown by farmers in 
the rural hinterlands of western Nigeria, and then 
sold directly to "primary wholesalers." These agents 
process the raw produce into elubo or lafun, bulk 
these products for sale, and supply them in the rural 
"periodic markets" (oja that meet at regular intervals 
- most often every fourth or eighth day - through-
out rural Yorubaland). "Secondary wholesalers" 
from urban areas such as Ibadan enter these rural oja 
on the demand side, and purchase these products in 
"bags" (large burlap sacks that weigh 250-300 
pounds when filled), the same units of measure 
noted by Hodder. The rural periodic markets are in 
general quite a distance from Ibadan: Gusten report-
ed in 1966 that the average distance from these mar-
kets to the city proper was 90 miles (p. 153), and 
rural buying trips today often take days to complete. 
The urban traders thus rely on hired lorry transport 
-just as they did in the 1960s - to deliver their 
purchases to their stalls in the specialized wholesale 
foodstuff markets. 
There are five of these foodstuff oja in Ibadan: 
from the largest to the smallest they are Bodija, 
Oritamerin, Owode Academy, Oje, and Sasa.2 Each 
are what Hodder terms "day" markets: they are open 
seven days a week, including holidays, from sunrise 
to after sunset. These markets are typically jammed 
with customers and very noisy. As noted earlier, 
each market operates in a geographically distinct 
location, and the travel time from one to another, via 
bus, can often be as much as 90 minutes. 
The secondary wholesalers sell elubo and lafun in 
these markets to both retail traders and consumers. 
Sales to retail traders are generally made in the 
aforementioned "bags." The typical unit of retail sale 
for lafun is the officially sanctioned congo, a plastic 
mass-produced bowl about six inches in diameter. 
Elubo is not sold retail in any standardized measure, 
but rather is stacked or piled into whatever the seller 
has by way of tins or baskets.3 Retailers of both 
products sometimes grind them into flour, which 
they then sell in congos. A consumer, however, may 
purchase unground pieces of elubo or lafun and 
employ the services of one of the grinders in the 
marketplace. 
In sum, the marketing chain for these products 
consists of the following linkages: farmer/producer 
->rural "primary wholesaler" (processer/assem-
bler) -> urban "secondary wholesaler" -> retailer 
or consumer. These products thus typically change 
hands about four times, and thus the marketing chain 
is essentially identical to that described by Gusten 
and Jones in the 1960s: Gusten notes (p. 69), and 
Jones concurs (pp. 90-95), that most staple foods 
"changed hands between two and a half and four 
times," with the average being "somewhat more than 
three turnovers." 
(b) Characteristics of our research sample 
In this study we focus on the activities of the sec-
ondary, or urban, wholesalers. Our working defini-
tion of a "secondary wholesaler" is 
a person who goes to the rural periodic markets to buy 
in "bags" and who sells his or her product - to at least 
some customers- in "bags." 
To ascertain how many of these traders operate in 
the marketplace, we operationalized this definition to 
read as follows: 
a "secondary wholesaler" is a person who has at least 
one "bag" in his or her storage pile. 
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Table 1. Numbers of urban wholesalers in lbadan 
Market 
Bodija 
Oritamerin 
Owode Academy 
Oje 
Sasa 
Number of lafun 
wholesalers 
80-90 
90 
15-20 
8 
3 
Number of elubo 
wholesalers 
70-80 
100 
2 
0 
2 
The numbers of urban wholesalers in each mar-
ket, based upon two separate counts, are given in 
Table 1.4 
The method we used to study the characteristics 
and the activities of these traders was ethnographic. 
During the summer of 1991 we gathered the raw 
data through a process of observation and both for-
mal and informal questioning of egbe leaders and 
rank-and-file members. In addition, we were allowed 
to attend three meetings of the Oritamerin elubo 
wholesalers' association. 
Our formal interviewing activity consisted of 
administering a questionnaire to 75 traders, a sample 
that comprised at least 10% of the lafun and elubo 
wholesalers in each of the five markets. 5 More 
specifically, 40 of these traders sold lafun, 30 sold 
elubo, and five were market-wide or city-wide asso-
ciation leaders who sold other commodities such as 
rice, beans, or onions. During these interviews we 
focused on each seller's personal history, member-
ship in his or her egbe, and how the association 
influences his or her business. We also asked each 
wholesaler about his or her access to rural-urban 
transport, the ways in which he or she saves and 
obtains credit, and his or her long-term aspirations. 
Those traders in leadership positions were asked 
some additional questions that were tailored specifi-
cally for them. 
In order to overcome the language barrier, we 
used both English and Y aruba versions of each ques-
tion. Furthermore, we were able to administer the 
questionnaires with the aid of a translator who was 
an experienced field researcher at the International 
Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in lbadan 
and fluent in both languages. 
The typical trader in our sample is 41 years of 
age, female, and illiterate.6 Family members (includ-
ing most of her school-age children) and apprentices 
help her conduct her business. She has few (if any) 
physical assets, does not own a car or a bicycle, and 
wears inexpensive clothes. She works seven days a 
week, and thus has little leisure time. 
She sells either lafun or elubo to both retail 
traders and consumers. About 50% of our sample 
said that they earn over half of their income from 
sales to consumers, roughly 10% of the wholesalers 
earn equal amounts of income from consumers and 
retail traders, and the rest earn most of their income 
from sales to retail traders. In rough terms, this sell-
ing breakdown is comparable to that reported by 
Jones in the late 1960s. 
(c) The market environment: Salient characteristics 
We characterize the market environment within 
which the urban wholesalers operate as "Nth-Best," 
for the markets for credit and rural-urban transport 
are incomplete, information is imperfect, and there is 
little government-provided institutional or physical 
infrastructure.' As a result, the transaction costs (and 
hence the marginal private costs) of doing business 
as an individual, atomistic trader in this environment 
exceed those that would be incurred by a trader 1in a 
world in which information dissemination is perfect, 
markets are complete, and the government provides 
adequate institutional and physical infrastructure. 
Access to rural-urban transport is problematic. 
Independent traders often cannot obtain such trans-
port, due both to their "smallness" and to the fact 
that this service, heavily dependent upon flows of 
imported spare parts, is subject to periodic disrup-
tion. Moreover, on the occasions when independent 
traders can get transport, they are unable to insure 
their shipments against loss or damage. 
The credit market is also incomplete. Indeed, 
most traders do not have access to formal-sector 
credit facilities: 59 out of the 63 respondents stated 
that they do not receive credit from commercial 
banks or other formal-sector institutions. The formal 
sector has several reasons for not extending loans to 
these agents. The typical trader is illiterate and can-
not provide a bank with written business records, 
does not possess acceptable collateral (e.g., land or 
accumulated bank deposits), and demands small, 
short-term loans that a bank is often unwilling to 
provide. The traders, for their part, are generally 
uninterested in obtaining formal-sector credit, even 
when it is available. 8 Traders, usually with literate 
friends, must sacrifice significant amounts of time 
(and hence potential sales revenue) in order to travel 
to a bank's premises during official business hours 
and complete loan transactions. 
These wholesalers, however, depend heavily 
upon credit. Access to this resource loosens a bind-
ing constraint upon trading activity: more credit 
enables a wholesaler to engage in more trading per 
time period because he or she is able to hire more 
apprentices, buy more bags, tins, baskets, and con-
gas, make larger rural purchases, and cover the addi-
tional transport costs.9 Increased access to credit, fur-
thermore, permits members to insure themselves 
against short-term fluctuations in demand and/or cost 
conditions. 
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In Ibadan, as elsewhere, information is not a free 
good. Indeed, the lafun and elubo wholesalers face 
significant opportunity costs when collecting infor-
mation on prices, costs, and other market conditions. 
The time required to travel between the urban mar-
kets and to and from the rural markets translates into 
lost sales revenue. Consequently, individual traders 
operate under conditions of imperfect information. 
Finally, there is a pervasive lack of government-
provided infrastructure. The authorities devote little 
or no time and resources to road maintenance, the 
building of drainage ditches, and other marketplace 
needs such as electricity and running water. The 
government also provides little in the way of institu-
tional infrastructure. For example, in both the rural 
and urban marketplaces official judicial authority is 
often nonexistent or indifferent to criminal activity 
and marketplace disputes of all sorts, including those 
over property rights. In one respect the legal system 
cannot extend its reach into the informal sector, due 
to a lack of human, physical, and financial resources; 
in another respect it chooses not to, due to the lack of 
large accumulated surpluses that can be extracted via 
bribery and corruption. As a result, the wholesale 
foodstuff trade in Ibadan's informal sector is carried 
out in an "alegal" environment. 
This situation, according to Hugon (1990), is typ-
ical of that prevailing throughout sub-Saharan Africa 
today. King (1990a) also emphasizes this fact, and 
points out (p. 143) that in Africa the state is in 
"increasingly obvious retreat from its earlier goal of 
providing services [such as] transport, education, and 
even law." Indeed, King argues that neither the state 
nor the "formal" ("modernized") sector of the typical 
African economy can even "aspire to provide" much 
institutional and physical infrastructure "in the fore-
seeable future" (1990a, p. 145). 
3. THE EGBES AND THEIR ACTIVITIES IN 
THE MARKETPLACE 
(a) The wholesalers' associations 
Commodity-specific egbes, including those for 
the lafun and elubo wholesalers, meet weekly in 
each of the five urban oja. 10 In addition, a larger 
umbrella organization, comprised of the leaders of 
all the commodity-specific egbes, operates in each 
market. There is also a citywide distributors' group 
- the Ibadan Foodstuff Sellers Association - that 
meets occasionally to address common concerns 
among the sellers of different commodities. Two of 
the objectives of this organization, as stated in its 
Constitution (pp. 2-3), are "to promote Unity and 
Solidarity among the business members" and "to co-
ordinate and intensify their collaboration and efforts 
to achieve a better life." 
As noted earlier, we were allowed to attend a few 
meetings of the Oritamerin elubo wholesalers' asso-
ciation. The members of this egbe elect their leaders, 
who (as in all the groups we studied) remain full-
time traders, receive no compensation other than 
respect and prestige, and cannot impose their will 
upon the· group, for all decisions are made by con-
sensus. Meetings are held weekly, usually last from 
two to three hours, and begin and end in group 
prayer. During the summer of 1991 members chose 
to pay a special fee that went toward the purchase of 
matching outfits. 
In these ways this egbe, like similar social struc-
tures cited in Papanek (1975), Doeringer (1986), 
Jagannathan (1987), and Purvis (1990), provides an 
arena within which the traders create and maintain a 
"group identity," or in the language of Ben-Ner, 
Montias, and Neuberger (1993), an "organizational 
culture." The social and religious unity Clearly pre-
sent within this institution, and in particular the 
respect accorded its leaders, indicate that social 
cohesion is strong. Furthermore, these social rela-
tions have value in the marketplace: this egbe (along 
with the others studied), translates its "social assets" 
into specific economic benefits. 
(b) Barriers to entry 
The egbes have used their social assets to main-
tain, over at least the past two decades, a two-layered 
barrier to entry into the urban wholesale trade in 
elubo and lajun. In order to sell wholesale, a trader 
must first be able to obtain selling space in the urban 
oja, and second, must have access to the elubo and 
lafun made available for sale by the "primary whole-
salers" in the rural periodic markets. But the egbes 
limit access to urban selling locations to members in 
good standing who pay both a registration fee and 
weekly dues. According to our survey responses, the 
associations seek further to insure their monopoly 
over urban sales by preventing nonmembers from 
buying elubo and lafun in the rural markets sur-
rounding Ibadan: a photo-identification card issued 
by the lbadan Foodstuff Sellers Association is, in 
general, necessary in order to make rural-market pur-
chases. 
The associations enforce these entry barriers by 
confiscating the elubo and/or lafun bought by non-
members and by boycotting rural vendors who 
refuse to do business with egbe members on the 
associations' terms. The social cohesion among the 
members, forged so carefully in the context of the 
egbes, makes this enforcement activity (or "defense 
technology," in the terminology of Jagannathan, 
1987) effective. 11 Indeed, during the summer of 1991 
we encountered only one active nonmember whole-
saler across all five urban oja, and she wished to 
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remain anonymous for fear of being detected by the 
associations. Hence the rural wholesalers do not 
have a market for their products outside of the egbe 
membership, and confiscation activity does not take 
much time and effort. Furthermore, in the "alegal" 
environment within which these markets operate 
neither nonmembers nor rural vendors are able to 
obtain recourse from the egbes' decisions within the 
official legal system. 
The associations exploit their favored access to 
the rural markets by specifying maximum buying 
prices and eliminating bidding among members for 
the products. Indeed, 47 of the traders in our sample 
stated explicitly that their association engages in 
these regulatory activities. Moreover, when we asked 
the sellers if their association has any "influence 
over buying prices," 49 of the 67 lafun and elubo 
wholesalers who answered this question replied 
either "much" or "some." 
The egbes most often deal with members who 
flout the rural-market regulations, do not pay their 
fees and dues, or in general violate group rules, by 
fining them. Sometimes the egbes prevent such 
members from selling in the urban market for a peri-
od of time (e.g., through confiscation of product). 
Several rank-and~file members also reported that the 
associations on occasion revoke the rural buying 
privileges of rule-breakers for up to three months. 
Indeed, during the summer of 1991 one member of 
the Oritamerin elubo wholesalers' egbe was found 
guilty of "rudeness" to the Chair and subsequently 
had his rural buying privileges suspended. He violat-
ed this sanction, was reported to the association, and 
during one of the meetings we were allowed to 
attend, we watched as he pleaded his case before the 
group. The members refused to lift the buying 
restriction, and moreover fined him 100-200 Naira 
(a sum that represents 50-100 meals for many of the 
traders). As Doeringer (1986) notes, such sanctions 
levied within the group tend to have a feedback 
effect on group cohesion and hence strengthen the 
egbes in their efforts to segment the marketplace. 
(c) Price and quantity regulation 
Throughout our questioning, we uncovered no 
evidence that the egbes attempt to regulate sales, and 
only weak evidence that they have influence over 
their members' selling prices.'2 Furthermore, at no 
time during the association meetings that we attend-
ed did the subjects of selling-price regulation and/or 
quantity-restriction arise. 
Indeed, even if the egbes wanted to regulate their 
members' selling prices, or enforce sales quotas, 
there are ample reasons why they would be unsuc-
cessful. For example, product quality can vary sig-
nificantly from transaction to transaction. In addi-
tion, the measures used in the urban marketplace are 
only imperfectly standardized. Prices and quantities, 
furthermore, are influenced both by the bargaining 
that dominates the interactions between buyers and 
sellers and by the existence of personalized clientele 
relationships that are known in Y aruba as onibara, 
or "regular customer," ties. In this context, effective 
selling-price regulation and/or quantity restric-
tions would be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
enforce. 
(d) Reduction of transaction costs 
The egbes utilize their "social assets" not just to 
create and maintain barriers to entry into urban 
wholesale trading, but also to reduce their members' 
transaction costs. More specifically, the egbes reduce 
the marginal private costs incurred by their members 
by: 
- Expanding their access to rural-urban trans-
port, 
- Expanding their access to credit, 
- Improving the flow of information in the mar-
ketplace, 
- Providing both physical and institutional mar-
ket infrastructure. 
The egbes enable their members to obtain 
rural-urban transport by contracting with the trans-
porters, through bargaining, for their services. These 
arrangements also provide for insurance: as pointed 
out by the Chair of the Ibadan Foodstuff Sellers 
Association, if any transporter loses or damages a 
member's bag(s), the association ensures that the 
transporter reimburses the member fully. 
Furthermore, the egbes act as "transporters of last 
resort" whenever there is a disruption in regular ser-
vice. The association leadership, in these situations, 
devotes . time and energy - time and energy that 
individual traders do not have- to seeking out 
transport alternatives. . 
The market associations also expand their mem-
bers' access to credit. Indeed, one of the egbes' cen-
tral functions is to provide emergency lines of credit 
for all members who pay their dues. This function, 
mentioned repeatedly by the leaders we interviewed, 
is spelled out explicitly in the Constitution of the 
Ibadan Foodstuff Sellers Association. "Objective 
Eight" (p. 3) reads as follows: 
The members shall coordinate and hannonize their gen~ 
eral policies especially in the following fields: ... 
assisting members financially or otbeiWise during times 
of difficulty and whenever necessary. 
The "social assets" acquired by traders in the 
context of their egbes, furthermore, enable the mem-
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bers to group themselves into well-functioning 
"Rotating Savings and Credit Associations" 
(RoSCAs), institutions that are ubiquitous in the 
developing world, and that are known as ajos in 
Yoruba.13 Association members have a great deal of 
information about each other and their business 
activities, and hence have little or no difficulty -
even in the context of a relatively large ajo - in 
screening potential borrowers and monitoring credit 
usage. Furthermore, there is no enforcement prob-
lem, for the costs of default are significant. The bor-
rower, in effect, puts up his or her social standing, 
business reputation, and business contacts as collat-
eral. 
Egbe activity also enhances the dissemination of 
information in the marketplace. The associations' 
regulatory activities in the rural markets and contrac-
tual arrangements with transporters enable their 
members to have greater information concerning 
rural purchase prices and transport costs, and hence 
to some extent prices in urban markets other than 
their own.14 In addition, the market-wide and city-
wide umbrella association meetings provide a forum 
for the sharing of information concerning rural and 
urban market conditions. In particular, they provide 
the commodity-specific egbes with the information 
necessary to plan and coordinate their activities in 
the rural marketplace and in the market for rural-
urban transport: eight of the 10 association leaders 
who responded to the question "What do you discuss 
with the leaders of the other associations at your 
meetings?" replied "buying prices" and "transport 
costs/problems." 
Finally, the market-wide "umbrella" egbes pro-
vide, where the government does not, both physical 
and institutional marketplace infrastructure. For 
example, membership dues finance night-time secu-
rity services, road maintenance, and the construction 
of drainage ditches. During 1991, as it has done in 
the past, the Bodija Foodstuff Sellers Association 
paid 15,000 Naira (roughly $1,070-$1,500, at the 
range of "bureau de change" exchange rates we 
encountered during the summer of that year) to 
regrade the roads - none of which the government 
paves or maintains - in and near the market. 
Beyond these activities, the Ibadan Foodstuff Sellers 
Association regularly lobbies the local and state gov-
ernments for general marketplace improve-
ments. 
The umbrella associations also exercise judicial 
power in areas where the local authorities do not. 
The local police, for instance, routinely refer cases of 
alleged theft and other petty crimes that occur in the 
markets to these groups. In addition, as discussed in 
section 3(b) the egbes themselves create and defend 
property rights for their members in the five special-
ized wholesale foodstuff markets of Ibadan. This 
activity translates. into cost reductions for members 
because first, it reduces the time and effort individu-
als must expend, on a daily basis, to defend their 
market locations, and second, it makes rural buying 
trips less costly, due to the decreased probability of 
locational "expropriation" by other traders while 
members are absent from their urban oja. 
In sum, we conclude that the egbes reduce the 
transaction costs, and hence the marginal private 
costs, associated with wholesaling elubo and lafun in 
the urban marketplace to a significant degree. The 
associations expand their members' access to trans-
port and credit facilities. They also create, in the ter-
minology of Arrow (1974), "information channels" 
through which "signals" as to market developments 
can be received, and they "coordinate" these signals 
through internal "communication channels." Thus 
the associations collect, process, and disseminate 
information that individual traders find too expen-
sive to acquire on their own. Finally, the egbes pro-
vide their members with both physical and institu-
tional market infrastructure. 
4. A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF EGBE ACTIVITY 
In this section we translate the above analysis 
into a more formal, graphical model that highlights 
some of the salient features of the urban and rural 
markets and enables us to show the conditions under 
which egbe activity contributes to social welfare. We 
demonstrate the possibility that when the urban 
traders form an association that both restricts access 
to the rural market and concentrates on reducing the 
transaction costs of its members, the urban market 
price falls, the quantity bought and sold in the city 
rises, and net social benefits increase. 
Consider first a world in which information dis-
semination is perfect, markets are complete, the gov-
ernment provides adequate physical and institutional 
market infrastructure, and perfect competition pre-
vails. The marginal private cost schedule that indi-
vidual urban wholesalers face when trading either 
elubo or lafun - here considered to be one product, 
good "x" - in this world is denoted in Figures 1 and 
2 as MPC1• But, as discussed in section 2, the urban 
traders operate in a very different environment, one 
we have labelled as "Nth-Best," in which the trans-
action costs of doing business as an atomistic agent 
are significantly higher. The marginal private cost 
curve in this latter world, depicted as MPCN in these 
graphs, thus lies above MPC1• 
In Figure 1, which depicts market equilibrium in 
the absence of all egbe activity, the quantity bought 
and sold in the urban market is Q0, as determined by 
the intersection of the urban market demand curve 
D0u and MPCN, and the equilibrium price is P0u. 
(Some loss of product occurs during transport, so Q0 
is less than the amount bought by the wholesalers in 
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Figure 1. The rural market for good x (top panel) and the 
urban market for good x (bottom panel) in the absence of 
all association activity. 
the rural market, Q0r.) The equilibrium outcome 
under these circumstances thus has associated with it 
a deadweight loss of economic welfare, which is 
represented by the shaded triangle in the bottom 
panel. 
Suppose now that the urban wholesalers organize 
themselves into an association that effectively 
restricts access to good x in the rural market, i.e., that 
acts as a monopsonist. The egbe will reduce the 
quantity purchased in the rural market in order to 
equate the marginal factor cost of x, MFC, with its 
marginal revenue product D0r, as shown in Figure 2. 
The quantity sold in the urban market thus falls to Q1 
(some loss of product still occurs during transport), 
and the price rises to P 1u, as determined by the inter-
section D0u and S1u. This equilibrium outcome is, 
clearly, welfare-reducing. 
Now let this egbe engage in the transaction cost-
reducing activities described in section 3, while still 
acting as a monopsonist. The marginal private costs 
of distributing good x in the urban market thus 
decline. Consequently, S1u in Figure 2 shifts down-
ward. In addition, there is now no loss of product 
during transport. Several outcomes are possible. In 
the worst-case scenario, the association's monop-
Figure 2. Rural market (top panel) and urban market (bot-
tom panel) equilibria when the traders' association is 
active. 
sony activity dominates the reduction in transaction 
costs. The urban supply curve thus shifts, for exam-
ple, to S2u, and the net effect of the traders' collective 
behavior in the marketplace is a decline in urban 
welfare: at the equilibrium point E2, the quantity 
bought and sold is less than Q0, and the urban market 
price is above P0u. 
The decline in transaction costs, however, may be 
so significant that the urban supply curve shifts 
down to S3u. In this case, on a net basis the egbes are 
welfare-enhancing. The market equilibrium quantity 
at E3 exceeds Q0, the price received in the urban 
market -(P3u) is lower than P0u, and the rural primary 
wholesalers sell more, at a higher price, than in the 
absence of all egbe activity. The shaded area in the 
bottom panel of Figure 2 represents the efficiency 
gain in the urban market in this scenario. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The results obtained in section 4 indicate that 
cooperation among firms in the marketplace, when 
focused to a significant degree upon minimizing the 
riskiness of conducting business as an independent 
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entity, can be welfare-enhancing. Yet the above 
analysis should be considered but a first step in the 
process of determining the efficiency advantages of 
the wholesale foodstuff traders' associations in 
Ibadan, Nigeria. 
The analysis in section 4, indeed, may signifi-
cantly underestimate the welfare-enhancing capabili-
ties of these cooperative associations, for three rea-
sons. First, recall from section 2 that in the absence 
of the egbes individual traders often cannot obtain 
access to rural-urban transport, let alone insure their 
shipments against loss or damage. As a result, the 
actual increase in the equilibrium quantity bought 
and sold in the urban marketplace due to association 
activity, compared to the increase depicted in 
Figures 1 and 2, is probably much greater. 15 Second, 
the model of section 4 takes no account of the fact 
that, for any given amount of product bought and 
sold in the urban markets, social welfare rises in the 
presence of egbe activity simply because these 
groups provide, where the municipal authorities in 
Ibadan do not, public goods such as roads, drainage 
ditches, and a legal framework. Finally, in section 4 
we take at face value our respondents' comments on 
the effectiveness of the associations' monopsony-
enforcement efforts in the rural marketplaces. If 
these groups, contrary to their claims as recorded in 
our questionnaire data (and contrary to our informal 
observations), are in fact unable to exert significant 
control over access to elubo and lafun in the rural 
periodic markets, then it is even more likely that 
egbe activity results in additional net benefits for 
society as a whole. 16 
Despite the necessarily preliminary nature of our 
study, some specific policy recommendations can be 
derived. In recent years the Nigerian policy stance 
toward the urban informal sector as a whole - simi-
lar to the one prevailing throughout most of sub-
Saharan Africa today- can be characterized at best 
as ambivalent, on average as one of "not so benign 
neglect," and at worst as one of open hostility and 
harassment (Lubell, 1991, p. 76; Trager, 1987). The 
Nigerian government, in sum, tends to vacillate 
between ignoring this sector as a whole, actively 
suppressing certain informal economic activities, and 
actively promoting other specific subsectors of the 
informal economy. 
For example, in 1987 the government launched a 
heralded "National Open Apprenticeship Scheme" 
(NOAS), in the attempt to support the traditional 
informal-sector apprenticeship system (King, 
1990b). But NOAS was targeted only at microenter-
prises in Nihan's "nonstructured modem" subsector 
of the informal economy, and thus was similar to the 
microenterprise support programs promulgated 
under the auspices of the multilateral aid community 
throughout the developing world in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s (as discussed in section 1). 
When it has addressed itself to the urban infor-
mal-sector foodstuff trade in recent years, however, 
the Nigerian government has focused on suppres-
sion. For example, the national authorities launched 
a "War Against Indiscipline" in 1984, that incorpo-
rated a program of "environmental sanitation" in the 
cities (Trager, 1987). Streets were cleared of infor-
mal sector market stalls; workshops and sheds locat-
ed along main roads were dismantled; inventories of 
traders and food vendors were confiscated. As late as 
1990 the government was still waging this cam-
paign: during that year the authorities demolished 
the historically largest and most important informal 
sector market in Ibadan - the Dugbe market - in 
order to make room for formal sector businesses 
such as commercial banks. 
Moreover, the Nigerian government tends to look 
upon informal sector trading activity as something to 
be taxed. Indeed, one bit of irony resulting from the 
attention devoted to the urban informal sector 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa during the 1970s and 
early 1980s is that, in the face of mounting evidence 
that this sector is productive and dynamic, govern-
ments such as Nigeria's have come to view this sec-
tor as "primarily a source of tax collections 
and [hence] informal sector participants [have 
become] tax evaders [our emphasis]" (Lubell, 1991, 
p. 114). 
To cite just one example of this attitude, a year or 
two ago the municipal authorities in Ibadan built a 
new foodstuff market (Bodija). But they devoted as 
few resources as possible to its construction (the 
infrastructure of this market was crumbling during 
the summer of 1991), and the market was laid out so 
as to make it easier to tax the activity within. Indeed, 
officials attempt to collect a tax on every single bag 
of produce that gets traded in Bodija, and in the 
other informal sector markets. 
Our analysis indicates that such policies are pre-
cisely those the government should not implement, if 
it wants to generate increases in employment, 
incomes, and living standards for the majority of its 
urban citizens. Furthermore, to the extent that policy 
is influenced by "first-best" welfare analysis and 
attempts are made to promote competitive market 
conditions, societal welfare may be reduced. In the 
"Nth-best" world in which urban wholesaling takes 
place, the traders' associations - egbes - which 
indeed are responses to this particular environment, 
may well be efficiency-enhancing. 
Therefore, it may well be optimal for the govern-
ment simply to allow the egbes to continue operating 
as they do now, and focus instead on complementing 
the associations' activities by, for example, develop-
ing the communications network, paving and main-
taining major roads and highways, making more for-
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eign exchange available for the importation of spare 
parts for lorries, and improving the judicial system. 
In sum, if the government wants to improve welfare 
for society as a whole, it may be best for it to work 
with the egbes, in accord with its own areas of com-
parative advantage, and not against them. 
NOTES 
1. In presenting the citations below, we make no 
attempt to be comprehensive, given the vast amount of 
work done in this general area. Rather, we seek here to 
acknowledge the material that has enriched our own work 
in a substantive way. 
2. The market we identify as "Oritamerin" is really a 
conglomeration of several markets that Hodder labels 
the "Gege-Oritamerin-Oja Iba" marketing complex, 
and which Gusten terms the "Mapo Hill" marketing 
complex. This complex dominated the wholesale food-
stuff trade in the late 1960s; its present ranking as the 
second largest foodstuff market in Ibadan indicates how 
similar the current foodstuff marketing process in Ibadan is 
to the process described by Hodder (1967) and Gusten 
(1968). 
3. The congo was developed by the traders' associations 
in conjunction with the government, and can be used 
because pieces of lafun are small and uniform. Elubo 
pieces, however, are large and irregular. Hence the lack of 
standardized selling measures for this product. 
4. These numbers are approximate because some traders 
might not have been present during the counts, due to ill-
ness or rural buying trips. 
5. Not all of the 75 traders, however, answered each and 
every one of our questions. 
6. To put the typical trader's age in perspective, life 
expectancy at birth in Nigeria today is roughly 50-55 years. 
With respect to education, the average number of years of 
schooling of the 58 traders who answered this question was 
2.70. Indeed, 33 of these people said that they had no edu-
cation at all. 
7. Note that this does not make these particular markets 
especially "different" from other urban informal sector 
markets in Africa and the developing world: the key 
features of the Ibadan informal sector market environ-
ment that we isolate here are similar to those uncovered in 
much of the Third World urban informal sector work, in 
particular the African studies, cited and summarized in sec-
tion 1. 
8. Of the 15 traders who revealed to us their preferred 
source of credit, none indicated that it was a commercial 
bank. 
9. When we asked the traders in our sample what they 
would do if they had "all the credit they wanted," 62 of the 
63 respondents said "Expand the business/operate on a 
larger scale." 
10. In some cases, wholesalers in the smaller markets 
belong instead to egbes in the larger markets. For example, 
the lafun traders in Sasa are members of the lafun whole-
salers' association in Bodija. 
11. Ben-Ner, Montias, and Neuberger (1993), writing in 
the "organizational economics" tradition, also recognize 
that social cohesion - which they discuss in terms of 
"organizational culture" - is critical for effective enforce-
ment of the organization's "internal rules." They point out 
that the controllers of an organization may manipulate its 
culture in order to "modify self-interest" (the root of so-
called agency-managerial problems) as part of their attempt 
to maintain effective enforcement mechanisms (pp. 211, 
222). 
12. We asked the wholesale association leaders in our 
sample if the egbes tried to "keep prices the same among 
[their] sellers." In response, the leaders claimed only that 
sometimes they required their members to use standardized 
measures when selling, and that they did not regulate prices 
directly. Furthermore, the traders in our sample were asked 
if their egbe had any "influence over selling prices." Thirty-
five percent of the respondents said "none," 22% answered 
"little," 30% replied "some," and only 14% said "much." 
Two points must be made about the traders who answered 
"some" and "much." First, it is possible that these respon-
dents were confusing wholesale and retail prices. 
Occasionally the retail price for a congo of lafun was 
set daily, and 81% of this subgroup sold at least some 
lafun on a retail basis. Second, these traders may have 
answered as they did on the basis of the egbes' success at 
standardizing their measures and influencing their costs of 
production, and hence their responses may not reflect any 
direct attempt at all by the associations to control selling 
prices. 
13. These RoSCAs are groups of people who contribute 
regularly (usually weekly) to a fund that is distributed as a 
lump sum to individuals in the group on a rotating basis. 
Forty-three of the 63 respondents said that they belonged to 
an ajo. The sizes of these groups ranged from 10 to 100, 
with the average size being 29 people. 
14. Of those traders who said that they do know the 
prices of their products in other markets, 25% based their 
knowledge on the dissemination of cost information that 
results from the associations' exertion of market power in 
the rural areas. 
15. More generally, given the data at our disposal, we 
were unable to quantify the extent to which the presence of 
the egbes increases the availability of elubo and lafun in the 
urban markets simply due to their contractual arrangements 
with the transporters. 
16. We were unable during our field research to collect 
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any primary data on the structure of the rural periodic mar-
ketplaces. A more complete study of the efficiency advan-
tages of the urban egbes would, of course, have to include 
an analysis of such data. Future research visits to Nigeria 
and Ibadan are planned, therefore, in hopes of correcting 
this deficiency. 
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